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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper reviews the options for different regulatory approaches for addressing 
demand for trafficking-related services. It starts by reviewing the debate on different 
types of regulation, and identifies types of smart regulation that might be most 
pertinent to measures to address demand for trafficking-related services. We then go 
on to explore options for developing more innovative approaches to address demand 
in the area of THB. We summarise some insights from other policy areas in which 
smart regulation has been applied. The paper then goes on to examine the 
challenges in adjusting existing approaches to regulation. We question one of the 
underlying assumptions of literature on regulation: notably, its rationalist 
presuppositions about the basis on which tools can be, and are, selected. We 
present a number of theories about the role of national styles, framing, or cultures in 
shaping the construction of policy problems and responses. We argue that these 
frames can delimit the scope that policy-makers have for adjusting existing national 
or sectoral approaches. Finally, we review literature on framing and issue definition to 
consider the conditions under which shifts in framing or issue definition to incorporate 
smarter approaches might occur. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The past three decades has seen lively debate among scholars and policymakers 
about appropriate mechanisms for steering societal behaviour. Much of this debate 
has focused on a critique of traditional “command and control” forms of state 
intervention. It has been argued that hierarchical control systems featuring legal rules 
and sanctions are overly clunky, bureaucratic, and fail to motivate compliance with 
desired patterns of behaviour. Instead, so the argument runs, policymakers should 
develop better or “smarter” forms of regulation, involving lighter touch steering 
through forms of competition, persuasion, peer pressure or design. 
 
These debates are of clear relevance to the question of how to shape demand-side 
measures on trafficking in human beings (THB). They share a preoccupation with 
identifying tools or mechanisms for steering undesirable forms of human behaviour 
(the consumption of services or goods whose production involved the use of 
trafficked persons); and the need to steer behaviour in areas in which traditional 
punitive means are problematic or have proved inadequate. So prima facie, we might 
expect the debate about better regulation and forms of smart regulation to offer a 
promising resource for identifying and evaluating different options for demand-side 
measures. 
 
This paper starts by reviewing the debate on different types of regulation, and 
identifies types of smart regulation that might be most pertinent to measures to 
address demand for trafficking-related services. In the second part, it goes on to 
question one of the underlying assumptions of literature on regulation: notably, its 
rationalist presuppositions about the basis on which tools can be, and are, selected. 
We present a number of theories about the role of national styles, framing, or cultures 
in shaping the construction of policy problems and responses. We argue that these 
frames can delimit the scope that policy-makers have for adjusting existing national 
or sectoral approaches. We then go on to explore options for developing more 
innovative approaches to address demand in the area of THB. In section three, we 
summarise some insights form other policy areas in which smart regulation has been 
applied. Finally, section four returns to the literature on framing and issue definition to 
consider the conditions under which shifts in framing or issue definition to incorporate 
smarter approaches might occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DemandAT Working Paper No. 4                                   Boswell/Kyambi 
 
3 
 
2 The Regulatory State and the Debate on Smart Regulation 
Debates on regulation date back to around the 1970s, when liberal welfare states 
were facing serious challenges to their governing capacity and legitimacy. We need 
not dwell too long on the reasons for this crisis – predictably, any number of theories 
can be marshalled to characterise and explain it. Most emphasise challenges created 
by the expansion in the range of functions assumed by welfare states over this period. 
On one account favoured by a number of German sociologists (Habermas 1976; 
Mayntz 1987; Offe 1972), welfare states were facing a legitimation crisis brought on 
by their failure to prevent economic crisis. In an attempt to compensate for its failure 
to secure economic growth, the state became involved in steering (or “colonised”) an 
expanded range of social spheres, over which it had limited capacity (Habermas 
1976). US legal scholar Cass Sunstein sees a similar expansionist tendency as 
emerging already in the 1960s, as governments (notably the US government) saw 
that formalisation and juridification of their efforts to protecting public safety from risks 
of various sorts increasingly created problems (Sunstein 1990). A third account is 
proffered by systems theorists such as Luhmann and Willke, who see such 
expansionist tendencies as a feature of the inclusivist logic of the welfare state, which 
establishes a cycle of ever increasing societal expectations and political guarantees 
about social protection (Luhmann 1981; Willke 1984). According to these theories, 
attempts at intervention to steer such processes are doomed to failure, however, as 
the political system is unable to steer behaviour in increasingly complex and 
functionally differentiated systems. 
 
Whatever the underlying structural causes, the 1980s saw a major adjustment in the 
nature and scope of state control over economic and social systems in post-industrial 
welfare states. In many cases, the state was being “hollowed out” through 
privatisation and outsourcing of public services to non-state actors (Rhodes 1994). 
The privatisation of state-owned assets by many governments was accompanied by 
new forms of regulatory supervision, which involved light touch or “meta-regulation” 
through specialized technocratic agencies. At the same time, a restructuring of public 
services saw many aspects of service delivery outsourced to private and voluntary 
organizations, and many services being made responsive to competitive market 
forces. These changes involved lighter touch regulation through incentive-based 
controls, and alternative modes of influence, such as through taxation regimes and 
information disclosure (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2010: 9). Many of these changes 
were inspired or justified through tenets of the “New Public Management” of the 
1980s (Hood 1991). The upshot of these changes was a shift from the post-war 
welfare state to a new form of “regulatory state”, whose mission was to steer 
economic and social systems, rather than to control them directly. And with this shift 
came the emergence of new programmes and technologies for governing social 
systems – as well as ongoing debates on appropriate tools for regulating complex 
social and economic systems.  
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2.1 Command and Control 
Before turning to the debate on new forms of regulation, it is worth considering the 
more traditional approaches which had inspired criticism. So called ‘command and 
control’ approaches are characterised by the use of compulsion. The state or relevant 
authorities command those being regulated to comply with certain stipulations. 
Compliance is then controlled through the threat of sanctions – and thus criminal law 
is a main area of application. The rationale behind this mandatory approach is based 
on the theory of deterrence (Teitenberg 1992). On this account, compliance is a 
function of the probability of an offender being punished, and the severity of the 
penalty. Severe penalties, in principle, create strong incentives for individuals, firms 
or organizations to comply. Such approaches are also associated with more rigid 
forms of regulation (Sinclair 1997), which are not responsive to the particular 
problems or needs of those being regulated. They are also associated with more top-
down approaches to developing regulation, which emanate from the state rather than 
being developed in cooperation with regulatees. 
 
Given the barrage of criticism levelled against command and control regulation, it is 
easy to dismiss such approaches as flawed: they have been depicted as overly 
cumbersome, rigid, difficult to enforce, and liable to produce distortions and gaming 
on the part of those being regulated. Yet the command and control model has been 
the mainstay of approaches to regulation across a range of areas of the economy 
and society, and arguably has proved remarkably successful and enduring. 
Individuals and organizations internalise and comply with a huge variety of rules and 
regulations, based on the threat of sanctions. Moreover, as Sinclair (1997) points out, 
much of the discussion on regulation has constructed a false dichotomy between 
strict command and control, and pure forms of self-regulation or smart control. Much 
of the more critical literature on command and control offers a very black and white 
picture of competing modes of regulation. In reality, most forms of regulation contain 
a mixture of different mechanisms – a point we shall pick up on when we consider the 
concept of the ‘pyramid of control’. 
 
Turning now to the debate on new, ‘smart’ forms of regulation, Colin Scott (2002) 
suggests classifying these alternative forms of regulation into three main groups: 
market-based mechanisms, which use forms of rivalry or competition to incentivize 
desired behaviour; community based mechanisms, involving forms of persuasion or 
peer pressure; and attempts to influence behaviour through design.  
 
2.2  Market-Based Mechanisms 
Of these three, market-based mechanisms were the first to emerge and have 
arguably been the most pervasive. Such approaches aim to provide incentives for 
firms, organizations or individuals to adopt cost-effective solutions, for example 
through the tools of privatisation, markets, auctions, pricing and fiscal incentives 
(taxes and subsidies) (Veljanovski 2010: 30). Thus, for example, the privatisation of 
utilities was expected to lead to more efficient production and lower costs for 
consumers, through the creation of competition between firms to win customers. 
Similarly, the introduction of tendering processes for subcontracting was aimed at 
bringing down costs and improving the quality of service provision through creating a 
market, while the introduction of tradable pollution or emission rights was intended to 
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reduce pollution in a way that was least costly to firms. A further example was the 
use of prices to ration usage, as in the case of congestion charging. Such market-
based approaches proliferated across different sectors from the 1990s onwards, with 
mixed results. Indeed, the debate on the impact of privatisation or outsourcing certain 
government services to private providers is still very much ongoing in many EU 
countries. 
 
2.3 Peer Pressure 
The second type of regulation involves forms of persuasion through increasing or 
deliberately activating peer pressure. The basic idea is that firms, organizations or 
individuals will be motivated through a desire for social affirmation, or – more 
negatively – by concern to avoid reputational loss. Alternatively (or in addition) they 
may also be swayed to behave altruistically by a commitment to collective goals or a 
sense of shared fate. Examples of regulation tapping into reputational concerns might 
include forms of peer review or benchmarking which “name and shame” or “name 
and fame” organizations. For example, school or hospital league tables might 
galvanise poorer performing organizations to improve their services (when combined 
with consumer choice, they may also trigger market-style behaviour akin to the first 
type of regulation – see above).  
 
Moral suasion approaches are often combined with other forms of regulation. Indeed, 
a number of scholars have argued that these types of approaches need to go hand in 
hand with more punitive measures. These ‘combined’ approaches are discussed in 
2.5 below.  
 
2.4 Design 
Finally, we can point to a literature that seeks to steer behaviour through design. The 
idea here is that people can be subtly – often inadvertently – steered to make the 
“right” choices through influencing the decision-making environment. This can involve 
building in architectural or design features that delimit choices to pursue undesirable 
behaviour – such as blue lights in toilets to deter drug users, layout of roads to 
prevent speeding. Or it can involve the use of technology to prevent certain types of 
transgression – such as biometrics to limit fraud or forgery, or phone texts to prompt 
timely payments.  
 
One particularly fashionable variant of steering through design is the so-called ‘nudge’ 
approach, most famously expounded by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein in 
their bestselling book (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The authors draw on a range of 
research from behavioural psychology and economics to suggest how social 
environments could be designed in a way that subtly steers people to make more 
enlightened choices – whether about which type of food to eat, whether to sign up to 
a pension scheme, or when to renew a subscription. These interventions are based 
on behavioural research about the types of biases and heuristics that influence 
human decision-making, many of which encourage choices which run against 
people’s best or longer-term interests. The idea of ‘nudge’ is that governments can 
subtly, even subliminally, prompt people to make better decisions without heavy-
handed intervention or explicit coercion. Its advocates see it as a form of ‘libertarian 
paternalism’.  
DemandAT Working Paper No. 4                                   Boswell/Kyambi 
 
6 
 
 
The nudge philosophy has attracted a great deal of attention from policy-makers, 
notably in the UK and the US, where governments have set up new units to conduct 
research and inform policy. In the UK, the ‘Behavioural Insights Team (better known 
as the ‘Nudge Unit’) has been behind measures to encourage organ donations, 
charitable giving, and renewal of driving licences. It claims to have saved tax-payers 
millions of pounds through relatively low-cost and unobtrusive interventions. For 
example, it has been proven that the share of organ donators in a population is much 
higher if individuals have to opt out rather than opt in to organ donation. The nudge 
agenda also firmly supports certain kinds of methodology for underpinning its 
interventions, notably randomised controlled trials to understand behaviour. Critics of 
‘nudge’ have focused around two perceived problems with this approach. Firstly, 
many have objected the paternalist nature of nudge approaches, and especially the 
idea of subconscious or subliminal control of subjects. The second critique – 
especially relevant for our purposes – is the point that the applicability of such 
approaches is quite delimited. Nudge seems to work best where individual choices 
are malleable and open to steering, and where the ‘nudged’ choice is not seen as 
running contrary to the perceived interests of the individual. Nudge would be less 
applicable in cases where individuals have strong preferences, and would therefore 
be likely to work harder to evade the choices being steered through design. 
 
2.5 Combined Approaches 
As noted above, some authors have suggested that regulation should ideally involve 
a combination of different approaches to steering. Ayres and Braithwaite, for example, 
developed the idea of the “pyramid of enforcement”. They argued that regulation of 
corporations has the best chances of success where punitive measures – “big sticks”, 
as they call them – are kept in the background for use as a last resort. Punitive 
enforcement is costly, and can generate a culture of resistance. Instead, 
governments should “speak softly”, relying in most instances on forms of “moral 
suasion” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 19-20). This implies fostering norms among 
those subject to regulation, such that they will be self-motivated to comply (Moran 
2002). Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid comprises softer forms of influence at the 
base, accompanied by more punitive, draconian measures only at the peak. It 
therefore represents a model or framework for combining more traditional command 
and control approaches with softer, ‘smarter’ ones. 
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Figure 1: Pyramid of mechanisms for steering company behaviour  
 
 
 
 
 
Licence  
revocation 
License suspension 
Criminal penalty 
Civil penalty 
Warning letter 
Persuasion 
 
Source: Ayres and Braithwaite 1992       
 
 
This approach relies on ongoing interaction between regulator and firm, so that the 
regulator can continually monitor compliance and adjust its strategy accordingly 
(Gunningham 2010). Critics have pointed out that this would be less appropriate in 
cases where there is serious risk of irreversible or catastrophic damage resulting from 
non-compliance, such that regulators cannot afford to gradually escalate their 
response (Ibid).  
 
Gunningham and Grabovsky (1999) developed a related approach based on so-
called “regulatory pluralism”. The focus here is on the simultaneous use of a broad 
and diverse set of instruments, often employed by a variety of governmental and non-
state actors, including the regulated firms themselves. The favoured mode is self-
regulation by actors who can be encouraged to develop a sense of collective 
responsibility, or “community of shared fate”. As Moran points out, this rather 
optimistically supposes that firms abandon their characteristically opportunistic 
behaviour, instead being motivated by collective goals (Moran 2002). However, such 
forms of moral suasion may have more traction in (non-market) contexts where 
individuals are strongly motivated to secure social approval through 
altruistic/compliant behaviour. We shall return to this point later. 
3 Applying the Theory to Demand-Side Measures 
How might these different approaches to regulation – including the options for “better 
regulation” – be applied in the case of demand-side measures? This section will 
identify ways in which different regulatory approaches might be applied, drawing on 
examples from other relevantly similar policy areas. The areas selected are 
regulation of illegal employment; regulation of narcotics; and regulation of tobacco 
consumption. These examples were selected for two reasons. The first is that they 
involve attempts to prevent or reduce types of practices or behaviour considered 
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harmful. Importantly, they attempt to prevent or reduce such behaviour by seeking to 
influence preferences for particular goods or services. In this sense, we consider 
them to be potentially relevant for informing measures to steer demand for goods or 
services provided by, or produced with the use of, trafficked persons. The focus is on 
trying to bring about a change in preferences – for certain types of goods or services. 
 
Second, we have chosen these three areas because each has been the object of 
‘smart’ approaches to regulation. In the case of illegal employment, we compare two 
cases of attempts to make traditional command and control approaches ‘smarter’. In 
the case of narcotics, we compare approaches based on moral suasion in different 
societal contexts. Finally, in the case of tobacco regulation, we look at the use of 
design to try to steer people away from harmful consumption patterns. More detailed 
analysis of the three cases can be found in working papers D5.1, D5.2 and D5.3. 
 
3.1 Irregular employment: the use of ‘smart’ command and control 
 
The first case study looked at two sanctions regimes in the US and UK that tried to 
steer employers away from exploitative employment practices. Both could be 
characterised as essentially command and control regimes. Regulators sought to 
deter infringements through the imposition of employer sanctions, and in both cases 
the use of penalties could be seen as providing an economic incentive for employers 
to comply. However, often such penalties were either set too low or were too difficult 
to enforce, and thus were failing to act as effective deterrence. Thus in both cases 
policymakers sought to improve compliance by drawing on smarter forms of 
regulation. Some of these efforts involved risk-based analysis of compliance and 
deterrence which were self-described by regulators as ‘smart’ or ‘strategic’. To 
improve compliance, both agencies also tried out methods of co-opting retailers into 
monitoring supply chains either by using ‘hot goods’ remedies (these allow for the 
embargoing of goods suspected of having been produced in violation of labour 
standards) or by negotiating agreements with retailers that involved the latter taking 
on some monitoring or auditing role and thereby increasing economic incentives to 
comply. This implied mixing techniques of command and control with market-based 
mechanisms and moral suasion. 
 
Arguably the most interesting innovation of those we analysed was the use of data 
and evaluation to structure monitoring and enforcement, combined with strategic 
communication of enforcement results, as implemented by the US Department of 
Labor’s Wages and Hours Division (WHD). This more strategic use of data to help 
prioritise monitoring activities appears to have led to an improvement in compliance 
levels across employers.  
 
We suggest that these smart approaches to monitoring and enforcing labour 
standards provide relevant learning for policy innovation in regard to THB as labour 
exploitation forms part of THB. Our case study highlighted differences between 
enforcement approaches that sought to maximise the apprehension of offenders and 
approaches that sought to maximise compliance with labour standards as a whole. 
Understanding how labour inspection agencies can best deter employer demand for 
labour practices that infringe labour standards would be of clear relevance to 
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policymakers seeking to develop demand-side measures that reduce demand for 
trafficked labour. 
3.2 Illegal Drugs: the role of peer interventions 
The second of our case studies looked at measures to address drug use with a 
particular focus on heroin. Within the international framework on drug control heroin 
use is clearly illegal. However, enforcement approaches tackling heroin reveal a 
spectrum of options within which approaches rooted in criminal justice sit alongside 
approaches focused more on public health. Our study compared the cases of New 
York City and Rotterdam, which have been subject to quite different approaches: in 
the case of NYC, an abolitionist approach that criminalises drug use and relies on 
strong deterrents such as criminal sanctions in an effort to eradicate it. In the case of 
Rotterdam, a harm reduction approach that predominantly medicalizes drug use and 
focuses on providing treatment to reduce drug use and promote safer drug use 
practices. The case study looked at peer-related interventions, in particular the use of 
user group interventions to influence drug use. This is an example of attempts to 
engage with communities affected by regulation, involving them in monitoring and 
harm reduction/elimination. 
 
The analysis showed a clear contrast in the ability of such peer interventions to 
operate effectively, depending on the policy context. In the Rotterdam setting, the 
policy and legal context allowed the innovations developed by user organisations to 
steer user behaviour away from harmful practices to gain significant traction. This 
openness is proven by how quickly new innovations were adopted into mainstream 
services delivery, and how user groups had been integrated into mainstream policy 
process over time. The NYC experience was very different, with a prohibitive policy 
and legal environment slowing down the uptake of user organisation initiatives such 
that it lagged well behind international acceptance of needle exchange programmes 
as beneficial in reducing the spread of HIV infection. The human cost of such delay is 
indicated in the difference in HIV prevalence rates among injecting drug users with 
this not rising above 12% in Rotterdam in 1986, while estimates of prevalence in New 
York between 1985-1989 range between 40-50% (among methadone users) and 50-
70% (in street samples) (cited in Grund, Stern et al 1992: 383). Lurie and Drucker 
(1997: 606) attempt quantify the impact of the absence of needle exchange 
programme on the scale of HIV infections in New York. They conclude that the 
absence of needle exchange programmes contributed to 4,000 – 10,000 preventable 
infections. 
 
Limitations in comparability mean that it is not possible to determine, within the scope 
of the research undertaken, which approach to drug use is most effective in reducing 
demand for heroin. However, the case study clearly showed that harm reduction 
approaches left greater scope to reduce the risky behaviour and harm that 
accompanies drug use. Debates in drug control policy between the merits of use 
reduction and harm reduction show potential for being transferred not only into policy 
areas like commercial sex -a key field for THB, but also to other fields of THB. 
Adopting a harm reduction approach when making policy on issues such as 
commercial sex, domestic work and immigration could provide benefits in thinking 
through the likelihood of harm that accompanies certain policy interventions, 
including the harm of trafficking that may result from policy changes in other fields. 
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3.3 Tobacco: using design to steer tobacco consumption 
This third case study analysed the use of design to influence tobacco consumption. 
Design-related policy interventions are less common among policy interventions, yet 
there have been striking innovations in such approaches in the area of attempts to 
control the harmful effects of smoking. Two design-related policies were analysed: 
smoking bans to prohibit smoking in designated places; and plain packaging on 
tobacco products. The analysis looked at World Health Organization data comparing 
a number of different countries. 
 
The analysis yielded a number of findings of potential relevance to demand-side 
measure in THB. The first was the difficulty in teasing out the separate effects of 
different measures introduced to influence smoking rates and harm to non-smokers. 
This was a complex, changing policy environment in which simultaneous measures 
were often introduced, making it difficult to isolate the effects of individual 
interventions. A second relevant point was the significant difference in impact 
between partial and absolute bans. In terms of bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship, the WHO notes that partial bans have little or no effect 
on smoking rates. Similarly with smoke-free policies, designated smoking areas tend 
to greatly weaken, and even eliminate, the effects of smoking bans on smoking rates, 
although they were effective to reduce negative side-effects for non-smokers. 
 
The implications for these findings need fuller consideration in relation to debates 
regarding policy interventions on prostitution, a key field of THB, where there are 
divisions in approach between those seeking abolition and those seeking regulation. 
The evidence from tobacco control policies is that easy-to-evade measures do not 
change underlying behaviours with the effect of reducing demand systematically. 
Evidence from the case study of tobacco control policies suggests that demand 
reduction is achieved by effecting changes in smoker behaviour that in turn reduce 
tobacco consumption and prevalence. 
4 Better Regulation in Policy-Making? Critics of rationalist models 
of policy making 
The “better” or “smarter regulation” agenda has been wholeheartedly embraced by a 
number of national and international agencies – indeed, it has been something of a 
growth industry since the 1990s. One of its first European advocates was the UK 
Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF), set up in 1997 to help simplify and rationalise 
UK regulatory practice. The BRTF identified five basic tests for ascertaining if 
regulation was fit for purpose: proportionality, accountability, consistency, 
transparency, and targeting. It promoted the use of Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA) to assess the impact of different policy options, and set out the purposes, risks, 
benefits and costs of any given proposal. 
 
These ideas were taken up with zeal by a number of international organizations keen 
to expand their advisory role, the main protagonists being the European Commission 
and the OECD. The European Commission made better regulation a cornerstone of 
the Lisbon Agenda (adopted 2000), and in 2002 adopted the practice of RIA for all of 
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its proposals (RIA has subsequently morphed into “sustainability impact 
assessment”). The OECD has a unit devoted to regulatory performance, part of 
whose remit is to measure regulatory performance across its member countries. 
More recently the World Bank has adopted the mantra of “regulatory governance” as 
part of its development agenda, which includes encouraging recipient countries to 
adopt RIA methods.  
 
Underlying this better regulation industry are a number of assumptions about 
policymaking. As Baldwin points out, its advocates share a commitment to the notion 
that regulation can be improved through a rational appraisal of different policy options, 
which are selected based on criteria of efficiency, cost, coherence, and so on 
(Baldwyn 2010: 264). Baldwyn’s own critique of these assumptions is based on 
scepticism about the ability of RIAs to be of a “sufficiently high technical standard” to 
have an influence on policy. Indeed, studies suggest that RIAs are often rather 
cursory, superficial analyses, which tend to vindicate the selection of options that 
were already preferred (Radaelli 2007). 
 
These doubts are echoed in some of the public policy and organisational sociology 
literature. A number of authors have rejected the rationalist theory of policymaking 
embraced by proponents of better regulation. Scholars such as March and Olsen 
(1976), Cohen et al (1972) and Kingdon (1984) suggest that there is no clear causal 
and temporal sequencing of policy problems and solutions. Policymaking does not 
involve a linear process of defining a problem, identifying solutions, and then 
adopting rational criteria to choose among them. For example, problems do not 
necessarily precede or initiate policy responses; instead, the solutions favoured by 
politicians for dealing with particular social problems may have been on the agenda 
for years, but were never taken up because they did not garner support. Such 
discarded solutions may be revived, or rescued from the “garbage can” (Cohen et al 
1972). In similar vein, March and Olsen (1976) argue that for policy change to occur, 
three “streams” need to converge: problems looking for solutions, solutions looking 
for problems, and people looking for things to do. Models of rationalist or “high 
modernist” policy making assume that solutions are instrumentally fitted to problems; 
but often off-the-shelf solutions are simply applied (imperfectly) to problems that they 
do not remotely fit (Goodin, Rein and Moran 2006). 
 
Even if policymaking does not adhere to such rationalist, linear procedures, there is 
nonetheless strong pressure to justify and legitimise policy decisions in such terms. 
As Majone points out, justifications for policy decisions are often post hoc, deploying 
different arguments from the considerations which led to the adoption of policy 
(Majone 1989: 19). Organizational sociologists such as Brunsson (1993, 2002), 
Feldman and March (1981), and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) go further, arguing that 
organizations often adhere to rationalistic expectations about decision-making in their 
rhetoric and formal structures, while in practice their informal structures and 
behaviour follows quite a different logic – a phenomenon known as “institutional 
decoupling”. Indeed, organizations often seek legitimation and support from imitating 
other successful organizations in their environment, adopting the trappings of what 
are perceived to be efficient and rational decision-making procedures. This form of 
“institutional isomorphism” can arguably explain the diffusion of norms on better 
regulation across EU or OECD member countries. 
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A second critique of the rationalist approach builds on institutionalist and cultural 
approaches: theories emphasising the role of shared ideas, norms, traditions or 
cultures in shaping policy choices. Similar to the garbage can model, these 
approaches question the notion that policy solutions emerge as rational responses to 
objective problems. Instead, both policy problems and solutions are socially 
constructed, taking the form of shared frames or paradigms for making sense of 
social problems. Frames therefore represent different ways of constructing the same 
social reality. As Sniderman and Theriault put it, such framing effects “refer to 
semantically distinct conceptions of exactly the same course of action that induce 
preference reversals” (2004: 135-6). Thus it is the framing of the issue that leads 
people to change their beliefs about appropriate policy responses, rather than any 
change in the empirical conditions themselves. 
 
Such frames have significant effects on how people think about appropriate policy 
responses. They constitute “underlying structures of belief, perception and 
appreciation” (Schön and Rein 1995: 23). Jones and Baumgartner argue that such 
“issue definitions” have a significant impact on policy-making. They suggest that 
policy issues have multiple components. Usually, only some parts of an issue 
become salient at any one time. Baumgartner and Jones argue that “the set of issues 
that come to be associated with a given public policy is probably the most important 
element in determining its outcome” (2004: 50). Frames and issue definitions tend to 
become settled or entrenched ways of interpreting and debating responses to issues, 
delimiting the scope for identifying or evaluating alternative frames.  
 
There is a range of literature in political science and sociology that echoes these 
points about the construction of policy frames. Peter Hall has used the concept of 
policy “paradigm” to describe a framework of ideas and standards that specify policy 
goals, problems, and instruments for addressing them (Hall 1993: 279). Other 
authors have emphasised the dramatic and narrative nature of constructions of policy 
problems (see, for example, Roe (1993) on narratives; Edelman (1999) and Gusfield 
(1981) on drama). Finally, Schneider and Ingram argue for the importance of 
understanding how debates on policy interventions also involve the social 
construction of the target populations of policy interventions (1993). They suggest 
that the construction or framing of different groups in public debate and policy has a 
profound impact on policy agendas and policy design.  
 
Such ideas have been applied empirically to examine particular national or sectoral 
policymaking style. In the national style camp, Richardson and colleagues developed 
a theory of how national policy styles influence policymaking and implementation 
(Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan 1982). They argued that policymakers develop 
“standard operating procedures for handling issues which arrive on the policy 
agenda”. They distinguish two dimensions of policy style: the approach to problem-
solving (anticipatory v. reactive), and the relationship to other actors involved in 
policymaking (consensus v. imposition of decisions). Combinations of these two 
dimensions yield four distinct ideal typical policy styles. Different national styles are 
then (more or less neatly) classified along this four way typology. The implication is 
that these national approaches delimit the range of policy options that are seen as 
appropriate or feasible by governments. 
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An alternative approach to classifying policy styles focuses on variations between 
different policy sectors, rather than between countries. Sectoral theories of policy 
styles emphasise how different policy areas are associated with distinct approaches 
to regulation. The idea here is that certain features of policy areas or communities 
shape patterns of policy response, or what Hood et al. (2004) call “regulation 
regimes”. Such variation may be a product of various political, organizational or 
cultural factors. Hood et al. examine a number of sources of variation across sectors, 
classifying them according to Mary Douglas’ grid/group model. They conclude that 
there are important cultural variations in the way policy actors deal with risk across 
different sectors. Indeed, they argue that there is often more intensive interaction and 
knowledge exchange within particular risk domains (including cross-nationally), than 
there is across different domains within a particular state (Hood, Rothstein and 
Baldwin, 2004: 6). Whether one takes national or sectoral differences as the axis of 
comparison, the point is that policy-makers are not free to “choose” instruments on 
objective, rational grounds, but are guided by strong and often implicit norms and 
beliefs about how policy problems and solutions should be defined. 
 
To summarise, while the better regulation debate encourages policymakers to 
identify, appraise and select different tools based on rational and objective criteria, 
more critical approaches to policymaking suggest that such models represent an 
idealised and misleading model of policymaking. This implies the need to be cautious 
about the notion that “evidence”, “good practice” or other forms of policy advice can 
have a significant impact on policymaking. It is one thing to set out the pros and cons 
of different regulatory tools; quite another to expect policymakers to be willing/able to 
adjust their approach accordingly. Moreover, where policymakers do appear to be 
adopting modish new approaches, it is important to examine how far such shifts have 
resulted in substantive shifts in informal structures and practice. We shall return to 
these debates in section four, when we consider the conditions under which issue 
definition and policy frames can change. 
 
We therefore suggest combining analysis of regulatory options with an 
acknowledgement of the non-linear nature of policymaking, as well as awareness of 
distinct national and sectoral patterns of constructing/framing social issues. Moreover, 
we argue that researchers should be alert to processes of isomorphism and 
decoupling, whereby organizations make cosmetic adjustments to conform to 
fashionable management mantras about “better regulation”, rather than introducing 
substantive changes to practice.  
5 Issue Redefinition and Policy Change 
In this final section, we will examine the question of how institutions, cultures, or 
national ‘styles’ can influence the selection of approaches in different contexts. We 
saw in the analysis of other policy sectors that particular countries or sectors can 
develop quite different frames for constructing policy problems and responses. One 
good example of this was the case of regulating narcotics in NYC and Rotterdam.  
Different policy frames can become quite entrenched. Such frames may become 
stabilised and taken for granted, implying that any evidence or information 
contradicting them is dismissed, or not even properly comprehended. 
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Indeed, there may be much at stake in sustaining such frames. First, they may codify 
deeply held social norms about appropriate behaviour, or appropriate responses to 
the infringement of norms. And they may capture strong convictions about the causes 
and nature of transgressions, and about which types of measures are most likely to 
correct these. Second, such frames may be supported and perpetuated by 
institutional configurations. The government departments responsible for regulation 
may be guided by strong organisational cultures which influence how they define and 
respond to policy problems; and the wider policy community or network involved in 
policy deliberation and formulation is likely to develop patterns of reflecting on and 
debating the issue. The actors involved in policy making are also likely to have 
particular expertise or experience, biasing them towards certain types of intervention 
or monitoring. Not least, prevalent frames may also suit powerful vested interests – 
for example, businesses may be keen to preserve certain beliefs about the effects of 
cracking down on illegal employment or tobacco consumption, or political elites may 
gain popular support by adopting punitive rhetoric on drug abuse.  
 
For these reasons, it may be challenging or even impossible for public authorities to 
simply switch from one style of regulation to another. Whatever the apparent merits 
of ‘smarter’ approaches, it will be far from straightforward to import new ways of 
thinking about policy problems and responses. And this may well be the case in 
relation to debates about addressing human trafficking. The traditional focus on 
prosecuting perpetrators and protecting victims in most countries may suit 
entrenched ways of thinking about crime and punishment. Given prevalent social 
norms and beliefs about the causes of criminality, it may be more comfortable and 
reassuring to focus on symptoms of the problem and to construct the problem in 
terms of victims and perpetrators. Existing institutions may be configured in a way 
that lends itself to prohibition and criminalisation rather than more flexible and 
innovative approaches. Not least, political leaders may have limited incentives to 
adopt positions that appear counter-intuitive or overly complicated, in relation to 
existing narratives about the problem. 
 
Yet policy frames undoubtedly do change, and countries do learn from one another. 
Norms are diffused, and policy approaches in particular sectors often do converge. It 
is worth considering two different accounts of how such frames can shift.  
5.1 Issue Redefinition 
First, the literature on issue definition suggests that policy frames can shift through 
two types of (mutually reinforcing processes): shifts in venue, and so-called 
“boundary effects” (Baumgartner and Jones 1994: 51). Policy venues, as we saw 
earlier, can be understood as the institutions with authority to make decisions about 
the issue. Venue shifts can mean that actors from different policy areas or sectors 
become more involved in debate. Institutions structure decision making in a manner 
that privileges certain outcomes over others (Schattschneider 1960). For example, it 
can make a difference whether debate is limited to a particular set of “experts” or 
widened out to a broader circle of participants (Schattschneider 1960; Cobb and 
Elder 1983). 
 
Boundary effects refer to the spillover of issues into other areas, or “interconnections” 
between them (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). As Plein (1992) suggests, issue definition 
“is a process of establishing associations with other issues prominent on the political 
DemandAT Working Paper No. 4                                   Boswell/Kyambi 
 
15 
 
agenda”. Such associations or interconnections can lead to importing solutions or 
issue definitions from policy areas considered to be relevantly similar. 
 
A number of studies applying the issue redefinition approach have found that 
significant shifts cannot be brought about by single individuals or groups of actors. 
Moreover, as Bosso (1994) argues, societal value systems can impose constraints 
on problem definition. Shared norms and beliefs delimit “the range of ‘legitimate’ 
alternatives” (ref 184). Nonetheless, there are numerous studies showing that issue 
re-definition does occur. One example is the case of biotechnology, where public 
officials and interest groups succeeded in transforming the image of the issue from 
one of uncertainty and danger, to one of familiarity and opportunity in the 1980 in the 
United States (Plein 1991). Plein argues that this shift was brought about through 
four processes: (1) establishing the biotechnology industry as a collective voice; (2) 
forging alliances with established public and private interests; (3) associating 
biotechnology with popular issues on the policy agenda; and (4) discrediting 
opponents and critics of biotechnology.  
 
5.2 The Multiple Streams Approach 
A second, related approach to theorising issue redefinition can be found in the work 
of John Kingdon, and his “multiple streams approach”. Kingdon’s theory explains 
policy change as the outcome of the merging of three largely independent streams: 
problems, policies, and politics. Problems are defined as conditions considered to be 
in need of change. Such problems often emerge following crises or focusing events; 
or as a result of monitoring practices that identify changes in trends, or feedback 
about the short-comings of particular programmes (Kingdon 1984: 90-113). Policies 
are the manifold ideas or ‘solutions’ floating around the policy community at any 
given time. For an idea to be taken seriously, it needs to be considered sufficiently 
feasible, cost effective, and broadly acceptable to the policy community and the 
public (131-9). Ideas are rarely completely new, but typically involve repackaging or 
combining elements of previous ideas (124). They emerge, mutate and become 
accepted over time, through a process of gradual exposure and ‘softening up’. Finally, 
the stream of politics refers to changes in policy-makers’ perceptions of public 
opinion or the ‘national mood’ (146), changes in the configuration of organised 
political forces such as interest groups or parties, or changes in government, such as 
a new administration, or changes to key personnel or departmental jurisdictions (153-
5).  
 
Kingdon argues that policy change occurs where policy entrepreneurs are able to 
couple solutions to problems in a way that is politically acceptable. Frequently, such 
entrepreneurs have pet solutions that they have been nurturing for a while, and then 
wait for the appearance of a political ‘window’ to press for its adoption. Such windows 
may be opened by a focusing event, crisis or accident, or by more institutionalised 
events such as elections or budgetary cycles (Howlett 1998).  
 
Hall (1993:278) differentiates between the overarching goals and terms that guide 
policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain these 
goals, and the precise settings of these instruments. Most of the time, changes only 
relate to instruments and their settings without challenging the overall terms of an 
interpretative framework (policy paradigm). First order changes involve more of the 
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same measures, and second order changes introduce new instruments to realise the 
same goals. Third order change with a redefinition of key terms, goals and actors 
occurs more rarely, for example when anomalies and unanticipated developments 
call the adequacy of a paradigm into question (285). 
 
How might these approaches be applied to thinking about the feasibility of reframing 
European policies to focus on the demand side? And more specifically, the feasibility 
of developing more innovative or ‘smart’ approaches to addressing demand? The 
issue redefinition approach would imply the need for coalitions of actors – in the 
public, NGO and possibly private sector – to form alliances to redefine the issue. 
Such redefinition would be facilitated through a shift in venue, so that the question is 
debated in a forum more amenable to the new framing. As the literature suggests, it 
might also be constructive to link the issue to relevant policy responses in other areas 
– whether drug or tobacco control, or illegal employment, or other areas. If favourable 
lessons can be learned from these areas, or areas of association established, it might 
make it more feasible to promote a similar shift in issue definition in the area of 
demand-side measures on THB. 
 
We would like to suggest, however, that Kingdon’s approach offers the most 
comprehensive and helpful framework for thinking about policy change. On Kingdon’s 
multiple streams account, the precondition for effecting a change in issue definition or 
framing would be to disseminate an idea more widely across the policy community. 
The idea would need to become normalised over a period of time, with key actors 
being familiarised with the approach and “softened up” with regards to its merits. 
Second, there would need to be a shift in the problem stream. Policy actors and/or 
public debate would need to identify serious deficiencies with existing approaches. 
Such problem identification would typically be a result of a focusing event which 
highlighted the scale of THB, or could also involve the incremental build-up of 
criticism of current approaches. In order for the preferred idea or “solution” to be 
attached to this problem, a third factor would need to be in place: a political stream 
which was supportive of policy change. This may be more challenging in the area of 
THB: it is not a salient political issue in most European countries, and this may mean 
that political leaders are reluctant to invest limited resources in mobilising support for 
policy change. However, this is where the role of policy entrepreneurs becomes 
critical. It would be vital for influential actors – such as government ministers – 
committed to change to identify windows of opportunity, and to push for solutions. 
 
Part of this shift in problem and political streams might involve a shift in venue. As 
identified by Baumgartner and Jones, the involvement of a different set of actors and 
institutions could help shift which actors are involved in the debate, and the fora in 
which issues are debated. This could facilitate – and consolidate – a shift in issue 
definition brought about through the confluence of streams. Thus it is useful to see 
the multiple streams approach and issue redefinition as complementary, and 
potentially reinforcing. 
 
Finally, we should introduce a word of caution. As Bosso observes, the scope for 
issue redefinition or the adoption of a new policy idea will be constrained by societal 
norms and beliefs, and historically shaped institutions. Different European national 
contexts will clearly be more or less amenable to change, not just as a function of 
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policy streams. The scope for change will also depend on how deeply entrenched 
their societal modes of framing the policy question are. 
6 Conclusion 
Addressing the demand-side of trafficking has become something of a touchstone for 
some actors in the anti-trafficking sphere, particularly those campaigning for 
abolitionist approaches to prostitution.  There is often the belief that a focus on 
ending demand will greatly assist in eradicating THB as well as acknowledgement 
that policy making in the field of THB initially privileged supply-side measures.  The 
imperative to discourage demand is part of the 2000 UN Trafficking Protocol (Art. 9, 
para. 5) and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings (Art. 18, para.1).  However, what these references to demand mean 
remains both vague and highly contested with some seeing demand for trafficking as 
unmet demand for labour that is satisfied by using trafficked labour, while others 
interpret demand in trafficking as the male demand for commercial sex.  Whether an 
increased focus on demand-side measures to tackle THB will have the intended 
effects is debateable.  
 
Within this work package we have focused on understanding how demand for illegal 
or harmful goods and services is addressed in other policy areas with the aim of 
attaining greater clarity of what demand-side measures are and the effects they can 
attain. This paper offered an overview of different types of regulation, with a focus on 
“smart” approaches. It summarised some lessons learned from steering demand in 
other policy areas, in which “smarter” approaches had been attempted. 
 
The paper examined the conditions under which new approaches were likely to be 
developed in different policy settings. Critiquing prevalent rationalist notions of 
decision-making, we drew on literature from public policy that eschews linear, 
rationalist accounts of policy-making. These suggest that pre-existing policy 
responses or solutions are often attached to new problem definitions as they emerge. 
They also show how particular ways of constructing or framing policy problems 
become entrenched, making it difficult to win support for new approaches. We 
suggested that literature on issue definition and the multiple streams approach might 
be well placed to explain when and how issues are redefined, and new “ideas” 
become accepted in policymaking.  
 
We hope this analysis can contribute to thinking about what sorts of regulatory 
approaches might be suitable for addressing demand in THB; and for understanding 
the opportunities and constraints to adopting such approaches in different national 
settings. 
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